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PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
P. Raymond Lamonica*
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
Two series of cases dealing with the "intolerably confusing"' fourth
amendment issues raised by searches related to automobiles are
noteworthy. In the first, the issue of the scope of a probable cause
search of automobiles and containers therein is addressed. In the sec-
ond, the courts examine the permissible scope of a search incident
to the arrest of recent occupants of automobiles.
The probable cause search cases, for the time being, have
culminated in United States v. Ross.2 Having probable cause to search
the vehicle for contraband, the police opened the trunk and found,
then subsequently opened, a "lunch-type" paper bag which contained
heroin. The police also unzipped a red leather pouch and found cash.
On rehearing en banc, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
opening of both the pouch and the brown bag were constitutionally
prohibited. The majority concluded that the pouch and the bag were
entitled to the same protections afforded luggage in Arkansas v.
Sanders.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed and in so doing
recognized that its decision was "inconsistent with the disposition in
Robbins v. California and the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v.
Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins relied."'
In Ross, the court concluded that the scope of a warrantless search
of an automobile is "no broader and no narrower than a magistrate
could legitimately authorize by warrant."' The Carrol v. United States'
"automobile exception" was applied to the scope issue without
reference to there being a factual basis for the reasons for the excep-
tion. Thus, even though there are no traditional mobility problems
with containers inside a stopped automobile and even though there
traditionally has not been a lesser expectation of privacy in containers
(such as brief cases, envelopes, and suitcases), no warrant was deemed
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
2. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
3. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
5. Id.
6. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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necessary to justify a further search of containers in the automobile,
if it was otherwise within the reasonable scope of a probable cause
search. The court concluded, "If probable cause justifies the search
of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."7
The Court distinguished United States v. Chadwick' and Arkansas
v. Sanders by noting that "in neither.., did the police have probable
cause to search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter."9
The Ross resolution was presaged by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in State v. (Jimmie Lee) Hernandez."° Justice Lemmon, writing for the
five member majority, found Robbins v. California" not to be con-
trolling. In so doing, the court distinguished between "container cases"
and "automobile cases." Justice Lemmon defines those terms in the
following manner:
In the "container cases" (those in which the officers have probable
cause to search only a particular container, whether seized from
a movable vehicle or elsewhere), the validity of the search of the
container should be determined without reference to the coinciden-
tal fact that the container was seized while located in a movable
vehicle. But in "automobile" cases (those in which the officers have
probable cause to search the entire vehicle), the officers may
search any portion of the automobile and any container, lawfully
seized during the lawful search of the automobile, which is
reasonably likely to contain contraband.' 2
In (Jimmy Lee) Hernandez, the search of a plastic box was determined
to be an "automobile case" because the probable cause facts did not
focus on any particular type of container.'3
The Hernandez-Ross rationale appears to make the appropriateness
of a warrantless search and seizure for contraband within an
automobile turn on the nature of the probable cause. If the facts in-
dicate that the contraband is in a particular container, a warrant ap-
pears to be required, absent exigent circumstances or consent. If the
7. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
8. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
9. 102 S. Ct. at 2167 (emphasis added).
10. 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981), cited in Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2161 n.4. See State v.
Bible, 406 So. 2d 138, 141 (La. 1981) (Lemmon, J. dissenting).
11. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
12. 408 So. 2d at 917.
13. Id.
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facts indicate only that the contraband may be in the vehicle as a
whole, an officer may search without a warrant any area where the
contraband reasonably may be found. Thus, less precise information
provides a greater ability to search without a warrant.
Defendants may find it difficult to prove that there was probable
cause to search a container, but not the vehicle. The defendant is
presented with the dilemma of demonstrating that the state had bet-
ter information than the state itself contends. This problem does not
arise with warrant applications, since the prior information is thereby
preserved. While the United States Supreme Court directly stated
that the scope issue is treated the same as in a warrant case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not directly addressed that aspect of
the problem. More stringent scope of search standards may be adopted
in nonwarrant cases in light of both the anomalous factual position
in which the defendant is placed and the usual burden on the state
to prove a warrant exception.
New York v. Belton 4 addressed the issue of a warrantless search
of an automobile incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. In Belton
the defendant was one of four persons in a vehicle stopped for
speeding. The officers smelled marijuana and observed on the floor
an envelope marked "Super Gold." All passengers were arrested for
possession of marijuana. The envelope containing marijuana was
opened. The officer then retrieved a leather jacket from the back seat
and upon unzipping one of its pockets, found cocaine.
Even though there was not probable cause to search the jacket,
because there was probable cause to arrest a recent occupant the
Court upheld the search as incident to arrest, stating:
We hold that when a policeman has made a (1) lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, (2) as a contem-
poraneous incident of the arrest, (3) search the passenger com-
partment of that automobile .... The police may also (4) examine
the contents of any containers found within the passenger com-
partment ... 
The Court defined "container" as "any object capable of holding
another object," including "closed or open glove compartments, con-
soles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger com-
partment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing and the like", but
not including the trunk. 6
Significantly, the Court indicated that in order to establish a
14. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
15. Id. at 460 (citations omitted; parentheses and numbers added).
16. Id. at 460-61 n.4.
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"workable rule,"'7 it would follow the approach adopted with respect
to searches of the person: there need not "be litigated in each case
the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons sup-
porting the authority for a search."'8
The Louisiana Supreme Court's treatment of nonprobable cause
searches of automobiles and their contents has not followed the federal
approach. In State v. Crosby,9 decided after Belton, the court com-
pletely ignored the Belton decision and concluded that a search of the
passenger compartment was not valid because of the state's failure
to show a factual necessity to impound for an inventory search.' Justice
Lemmon, in dissent, indicated that Belton was applicable.2' In State
v. Blanchard,22 a pre-Belton decision, Justice Blanche, writing for the
majority, rejected the Belton incident-to-arrest rationale and indicated
the need for a factual justification of the reasons for the exception.
After careful examination of the factual circumstances, he concluded
that "[qjuite simply, the area which was searched was not within the
defendant's immediate control from which he could have gained ac-
cess to a weapon or destroyed evidence." Justice Blanche even sug-
gested the state had a "simpler alternative. .' to ask the defendant
to step away from the vehicle."23
This pre-Belton concern with factual justification has been con-
tinued after Belton in State v. Zito,24 wherein the search was not
deemed to be incident to arrest because the defendants had been hand-
cuffed and removed to the police car. In State v. (Michael) Hernandez,25
the court suggested that "the Belton rule can have no applications
after an arrestee has been handcuffed and removed from the scene,
foreclosing even the slightest possibilities that he could rearch for
an article within the vehicle."2 Justice Lemmon, joined by Justice
Blanche, dissented based upon a determination that the facts would
justify an inventory search. Justice Blanche, the author of Blanchard,
suprisingly noted in regard to the Belton issue: "[W]hether the Loui-
siana Constitution is broader than the United States Constitution
relative to Fourth Amendment principles is a question that the writer
17. Id. at 460.
18. Id. at 459 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973)). Apparently the Court is satisfied that there is a need if the search is
"contemporaneous." The delay in time, of course, can also present disputed factual issues.
19. 403 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1981).
20. Id. at 1220.
21. Id. (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
22. 374 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1979).
23. Id. at 1250.
24. 406 So. 2d 167 (La. 1981).
25. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
26. Id. at 1385.
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has not considered ..... [If it is] this writer feels that the Constitu-
tion is due for an amendatory change in the opposite direction." 7
Curiously, the majority had interpreted the Louisiana provision in the
same manner as Justice Blanche in his earlier Blanchard decision. That
is, the court simply looked at the record to see if the actual facts
supported the reason for the incident to arrest exception. This will-
ingness to look to the facts to determine if the reasons for the excep-
tion actually exist, rather than embracing the Belton per se fiction,
is commendable because it assures that the reasons for the rule are
factually present. Whether the court will continue this practice is
uncertain.
The Ross and Belton lines of cases can coalesce factually and create
issues not yet resolved. Rarely will a defendant carrying a container
for which there is probable cause to search for contraband not also
be subject to arrest based upon the same facts. If he is stopped in
a vehicle and the officers have probable cause to search the container
only, Ross and (Jimmie Lee) Hernandez would suggest a search war-
rant is necessary. However, if the search is deemed to be incident
to an arrest and the container is in the passenger compartment, Belton
would suggest a warrant is not necessary. The (Michael) Hernandez,
Zito, and Blanchard cases would suggest a warrant is necessary unless
the defendant was actually in a position to destroy evidence or ob-
tain a weapon from the container.
United States v. Chadwick, contrary to Belton's per se rule, in-
dicated that an examination of the actual facts of each case was ap-
propriate in container cases, even when associated with vehicles.
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other per-
sonal property not immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee to their exclusive control and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize
a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no
longer an incident of the arrest.28
Application of the Chadwick-(Michael) Hernandez factual reality test,
as opposed to the Belton fiction, provides a more satisfactory resolu-
tion in automobile cases. If this approach is followed, when there is
a probable cause arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle and prob-
able cause to search only a container within the vehicle, a warrant
is required unless there is a factual necessity to search incident to
arrest.
If there is probable cause to arrest, but a full custody arrest does
not take place prior to searching, the results appear even less cer-
27. Id. at 1387 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
28. 433 U.S. at 15.
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tain. Cupp v. Murphy' indicates only a limited factually justified search
is available absent a "formal arrest."3 In Cupp the Court noted, "[W]e
do not hold that a full Chimel search would have been justified in
this case without a formal arrest and without a warrant. 3 1 A formal
arrest or a warrant may be required to assure that the relevant pro-
bable cause facts are "frozen" at some specific point in time, so that
realistic judicial supervision may take place.
Finally, there may be a need to distinguish searches incident to
arrest in light of the nature of the items to be searched. If the arrest
involves the possession of contraband in a container in the passenger
compartment of a car, there should at least be a factual justification
for the search to eliminate the issue of the arrest being a pretext
for a warrantless search.
No doubt further developments in automobile related searches will
continue to add confusion and inconsistencies. It may be that "bright
lines" cannot be substituted for fundamental evaluation of individual
and governmental interests in light of the facts of each case. A judicial
system which allows parties fully to litigate the facts of "pain and
suffering" resulting from an intersectional automobile collision should
not be niggardly with realistic fact evaluation in connection with in-
dividual privacy protections.
WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO HOME To ARREST: STANDING
The United States Supreme Court in Payton v. New York"3 held
that the fourth amendment requires an arrest warrant for a nonconsen-
sual entry into an arrestee's home to make a routine felony arrest.3
Subsequently, in Steagald v. United States,34 agents entered the home
of a person not the subject of their arrest warrant without consent
or exigent circumstances. The Court held a search warrant was re-
quired by the Constitution.
Several interesting Louisiana cases have applied the Payton-
Steagald doctrines. In State v. Smith"3 the Louisiana Supreme Court
acknowledged thd application of Payton and the parallel Louisiana Con-
29. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
30. Id. at 296. A concern is to assure that the officer really had probable cause
to arrest at the time of the search and that the probable cause to arrest is not a
pretext to authorize a search.
31. Id. at 296.
32. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
33. See State v. Brown, 387 So. 2d 567 (La. 1980), in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court applied the Payton rationale in interpreting article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution.
34. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). See State v. Wolfe, 398 So. 2d 1117 (La. 1981).
35. 392 So. 2d 454 (La. 1981).
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stitution doctrine but found the exigent circumstances exception ap-
plicable, stating: "[T]he present case presented the officers with
exigent circumstances necessitating a prompt entry to secure the ar-
rest of a dangerous felon." 6 Smith is particularly noteworthy because
of language indicating that the court was not required to consider
the retroactivity of Payton, since the defendant was not in his own
home and would lack standing under the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The court went on to determine that State
v. Brown,37 which adopted the Payton rationale for the Louisiana Con-
stitution, would not be applied retroactively.38 However, the decision
expressly noted that, with respect to the state constitution, "Smith
had the right to raise the validity of Kelly's arrest only under Loui-
siana Constitution Article 1, Section 5 (1974)."'3
In State v. Barrett" the court was faced directly with the expand-
ed standing provision of article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion in a Payton-Steagald context. Officers with reliable knowledge
of the existence of an arrest warrant entered the home of a third
person without a search warrant as Steagald requires. Under the
fourth amendment, the defendant lacked standing to object." Under
article 1, section 5, the court was presented with the question of
whether the defendant was "adversely affected" by the unconstitu-
tional entry. The court concluded, "[W]e are not prepared to say that,
within the meaning and purpose of our constitutional provision, defen-
dant was 'adversely affected' " by the illegal entry . . . so as to re-
quire suppression of the evidence seized from his person.""
Chief Justice Dixon dissented, relying upon the article 1, section
5 "adversely affected" language. Justice Dennis, who did not par-
ticipate in the original hearing, dissented from the denial of rehear-
ing on the same grounds as Justice Dixon in his dissent. Justice
Lemmon concurred in the denial of rehearing, finding a reasonable
exception to Payton-Steagald due to exigent circumstances created by
the absence of probable cause to obtain a search warrant and the
good faith attempt to verify the reliability of the information given
by the informant. Interestingly, Justice Lemmon made no reference
to his opinion in State v. Smith,3 which assumes, in the Payton con-
text, article 1, section 5 application.
36. Id. at 457.
37. 387 So. 2d 567 (La. 1980).
38. See also United States v. Johnson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4742 (U.S. June 22, 1982).
39. 392 So. 2d at 458 n.4.
40. 408 So. 2d 903 (La. 1981).
41. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980).
42. 408 So. 2d at 905 (emphasis added).
43. See text at notes 35-36, supra.
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The standing question is not new." The Louisiana Supreme Court
has addressed it previously in the fourth amendment attenuation
context." It again seems, however, that the court's analysis may be
easily misconstrued. To suggest that the defendant was not "adversely
affected" by the unconstitutional search is unrealistic. Finding,
however, that he was adversely affected does not require application
of the exclusionary sanction. The court properly noted that the defen-
dant's privacy rights were not factually affected; there was a valid
arrest warrant and a valid search incident to arrest; the arrest war-
rant would have authorized entry into the defendant's own home and
search of his person incident to arrest. Additionally, while the third
party's rights were violated, the nature of the violation in this case
does not require the harsh exclusionary sanction, since the officers
did not know who had leased the residence and there was no evidence
of an unreasonable manner of entry.
If, however, the officers lacked an arrest warrant as well as a
search warrant and without consent or exigent circumstances entered
the home of a third party to effect the arrest, an exclusionary sanc-
tion would be more appropriate. In both instances the defendant is
"adversely affected," but direct evaluation of the exclusionary remedy
and its purpose should produce different analysis and result.
Article 1, section 5 standing analysis ought to be addressed in
light of the purpose of the exclusionary sanction, which is the real
issue. If the conduct in question is such that an exclusionary sanction
will not promote privacy, nor deter unreasonable police conduct, nor
sustain the integrity of the judicial process itself, then it should not
be applied. The exclusionary sanction need not be applied automatical-
ly, even though a person is given the right to raise the issue and
develop facts relating to the nature of the search, which is usually
at least indirectly relevant to exclusionary policy. This approach, of
course, does not make the analysis easier; it does require direct focus-
ing on the reason for the rule or sanction.
In the Steagald context, the article 1, section 5 analysis will be
even more complex than in the attenuation issue previously addressed
by the court.4" One might reasonably suggest that the exclusionary
sanction should not apply when a defendant is arrested with an ar-
rest warrant in the home of a third party, but without a search war-
rant, with respect to items found on his person. The issue becomes
more difficult when other evidence is found. If evidence is seen in
the home while the officers are effecting an arrest, competing prin-
44. See Lamonica, Work of the Lou isiana Appellate Courts .br the 1976-77 Term-
Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 38 LA. L. REV. 516 (1978).
45. See State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976).
46. See Lamonica, supra note 44.
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ciples arise. Traditionally, if an officer has the right to be in a place,
his observations do not constitute a search. If circumstances make
obtaining a warrant impractical, the seizure is valid. 7 In the Steagald-
article 1, section 5 context, this raises difficult policy issues. The
evidence found on the premises cannot be used against the third party
in light of Steagald. If Louisiana courts find that the exclusionary sanc-
tion is inappropriate under article 1, section 5 in circumstances like
those in Barrett, it need not also allow use of the evidence found on
the premises of the third party against the subject of the arrest war-
rant. At this point, acknowledging that the person is in fact adverse-
ly affected, the court's analysis should be turned to the propriety of
the exclusionary sanction. After thorough consideration, with the
assistance of adversary counsel, the court may determine that the
evidence should be excluded, since the reasons for requiring a search
warrant are more clearly present than in the case where a search
of the person pursuant to an arrest warrant takes place.
Again, courts should not suggest that in one case the person is
"adversely affected" and in the other he is not. Rather, the court
should articulate why in one case exclusionary policy is appropriate
and in the other it is not. This direct analysis should promote a
reasonable and understandable protection of privacy interests.
DETENTION OF OCCUPANTS WHILE EXECUTING SEARCH WARRANT
The ability to detain an occupant of a residence while executing
a search warrant for contraband was considered in Michigan v.
Summers.48 The United States Supreme Court initially determined
that "[tihe detention of one of the residents while the premises were
searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on liberty, was
surely less intrusive than the search itself ... [and] 'substantially less
intrusive' than an arrest."49 The court then concluded that "it is con-
stitutionally reasonable to require [a] citizen to remain while officers
execute a valid warrant to search his home."'  The holding is limited
to the detention of occupants of the premises during warrant-
authorized searches for contraband. The Court specifically disclaims
an indication of whether such a detention would be justified in sear-
ches for evidence other than contraband.5' It also does not indicate
a willingness to relax the requirement announced in other contexts
that detention of a person be justifiable by articulable facts.52
47. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
48. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
49. Id. at 701-02 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 705 n.20.
52. Id. at 699 n. 9; see also id. at 695-96 n.4.
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The Court appears to suggest that when there is a warrant to
search a residence for contraband, the limited seizure of a resident
during a reasonable search is itself reasonable. Stated more traditional-
ly, one could suggest that the articulable fact that the person is an
occupant of a residence in which there is a prior judicial determina-
tion of probable cause to believe contraband is located, is sufficient
to justify a temporary detention or seizure of the person.
The Court did not flush out the limits of its decision. 3 One ques-
tion not reached in Summers, "whether a search warrant for premises
includes the right to search persons found there,"'" was addressed
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Beals." Beals was the
sole resident of the premises. The court, speaking through ad hoc
Justice Hall, reached a narrow result:
[W]here a warrant to search a residence for contraband is issued
on probable cause based on information that the occupant of the
residence participated in the sale of drugs at the residence three
days prior to the issuance of the warrant, the reasonable scope
of the warrant extends to a search of the pockets of the outer
clothing of the resident.6
Justice Lemmon, concurring, properly noted that there was pro-
bable cause to arrest the defendant and thus to search incident to
arrest. However, Beals apparently was not arrested but simply
"detained."57 In State v. McDonald8 the court approved the limited
search of outer clothing when the warrant particularly identified the
person who was the object of the search.
These cases appear to authorize searches of the person incident
to execution of a search warrant-not a traditional exception to the
53. The Court did not consider whether the same result would be reached in a
case involving a true "visitor," an administrative warrant, a nonresidential setting,
or noncontraband evidence. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Court developed
a "special connection with the premises" limitation in connection with a search war-
rant for a public tavern.
54. 452 U.S. at 695.
55. 410 So. 2d 745 (La. 1982).
56. Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added).
57. Justice Lemmon cited Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1972), which recognized
a limited right to search when there was probable cause to arrest even though an
actual full custody arrest did not take place. The Cupp Court was unwilling to say
that anytime there was probable cause to arrest, a search "incident to arrest" could
take place even though no actual full custody arrest was effected. A similar concern
that there will be an after-the-fact determination of probable cause or that there .will
be a search "incident to arrest" even though there is no arrest prior to the search
is found in the Beals situation, even where there is probable cause to arrest. See discus-
sion in text at note 29, supra.
58. 390 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1980).
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warrant requirement. In both instances there appeared to be probable
cause to arrest due to the nature of the search for contraband, but
no actual arrest was made until after the limited search of the pockets
of. the person's outer clothing. In neither case, however, did the court
determine that probable cause to arrest existed or was necessary to
justify the limited search of the persons on the premises while ex-
ecuting a valid warrant. This, therefore, appears to be a new authoriza-
tion for search of the person.
RIGHT To COUNSEL DURING INTERROGATION
The nature of waiver of counsel has been amplified in two recent
Louisiana cases.59 In State v. Matthews,"0 the court, relying upon arti-
cle 1, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution, stated that waiver of
counsel for interrogation was ineffective when (1) unknown to the
defendant, (2) an identified attorney is actually available and (3) seek-
ing an opportunity to assist (4) but the police do not inform the defen-
dant of that fact. The court continued to emphasize that it did not
"hold that an arrested person, not yet indicted or formally charged
with the crime, cannot voluntarily and after proper warnings waive
consultation with counsel and make voluntary statements which will
be admissible against him." 6'
Justice Marcus, speaking for a unanimous court in State v.
Trevathan," cited Matthews with approval and found that the state
had violated the defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The defendant, who had just
turned seventeen years of age, upon being arrested for murder, re-
tained counsel who advised officers not to interrogate his client or
take him to the scene of the crime. Counsel's instructions were not
followed. Significantly, the court did not find it necessary to deter-
mine whether the officer ignoring the instructions had knowledge of
them or acted in good faith, since "a defendant is entitled to deal
with the police as a single entity."6 These cases commendably enhance
the requirement that law enforcement officers act in a professional
.manner in adhering to the reasonable requests and expectations of
counsel with respect to interrogation of a client. The statement in
Trevathan that the police may be dealt with as a single entity places
a strict duty on law enforcement officers to assure that reasonable
requests of counsel are respected.64
59. See also, United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
60. 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982).
61. Id. at 1278.
62. 414 So. 2d 316 (La. 1982).
63. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
64. See Lamonica, supra note 44, at 528.
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In the related area of Massiah5-sixth amendment counsel rights
arising after formal initation of proceedings, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has continued to adhere to a stringent
standard. In Snead v. Stringer," the mayor of a city was under indict-
ment and had retained counsel. However, he continued to serve as
mayor. Over the telephone, he made an inculpatory response to the
district attorney, which was used at trial. The state courts rejected
Massiah-based error because they found that the statement was
volunteered."7 The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed
the decision of the district court. The district court had granted habeas
corpus relief because "the securing of an incriminating statement from
a defendant who was represented by counsel after indictment in the
absence of presence of defense counsel or a waiver thereof is a depriva-
tion of such a defendant's right to counsel as described in Massiah
v. United States.
68
The dissent of three justices of the United States Supreme Court
on application for certiorari by the state may indicate a changing at-
titude toward Massiah. The dissenters considered the fact that the
statement was volunteered to be critical and an elimination of Massiah
error. There was no articulated concern with whether, under the sixth
amendment, it is appropriate for the state to communicate with a
defendant under circumstances where it is reasonable to expect to
illicit a response without an affirmative waiver of counsel. The dissent-
ing justices appear to be willing to assume that a "volunteered" state-
ment implicitly involves a waiver of counsel and are willing to look
at all of the factual circumstances to determine if waiver has taken
place. 9 This line of thought may effect a dramatic change in the
Massiah doctrine. It is noteworthy that the justices who have ad-
vocated "bright line" tests in other areas feel very uncomfortable with
such a test in the right to counsel context.
65. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
66. 454 U.S. 988 (1982) (mem.) (three justices dissenting), denying cert. to 640 F.2d
383 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. Stringer v. State, 372 So. 2d 378, 382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
68. 454 U.S. at 992 (quoting the opinion of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama).
69. See State v. Huntley, 418 So.2d 538 (La. 1982). Much emphasis was placed
on the noncoercive voluntary nature of the interrogation, contrary to prior Massiah-
based case analysis.
70. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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